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Abstract
This paper demonstrates that a link between infrastructure capital and produc-
tivity growth can lead to multiple balanced growth equilibria if one accounts for
the endogenous provision of infrastructure. Starting with the contribution of Barro
(1990), the literature on infrastructure and growth mainly focuses on the relation be-
tween private and public capital investments. In contrast, we focus on the relationship
between the provision of infrastructure capital and a country’s innovative capacity.
This is consistent with recent empirical evidence that reports a positive link between
the two variables. The framework leads to bivariate causality between the rate of
technical change and the provision of infrastructure services and generates scope for
multiple strictly positive balanced growth equilibria.
1 Introduction
Physical infrastructure capital deviates from other types of capital in two important ways:
it is (partly) non-excludable and (partly) non-rival. The former raises the question of an
appropriate ﬁnancing since a partly excludability allows for a private provision. The latter
has important implications for economic growth and development. That is, an increase in
the infrastructure capital stock exerts an externality on all private producers if infrastruc-
ture capital is partly non-rival. In this regard, the provision of productive infrastructure
1capital can potentially aﬀect long-run growth comparable to the functioning of non-rival
knowledge in the endogenous growth theory.
In this paper, we account for both particular features of infrastructure capital to analyze
the interdependence between economic growth and the provision of infrastructure capital in
a transition economy that is initially constraint by a scarce infrastructure capital stock. We
demonstrate in the framework of an endogenous growth model that there exists a two-way
causality between the long-run balanced growth path and the provision of infrastructure
capital in the economy. This bivariate causality leads to multiple strictly positive balanced
growth equilibria.
The theoretical literature on infrastructure and growth literature is substantially inﬂuenced
by the work of Barro (1990). This approach lumps together private and infrastructure
capital with intellectual capital that is accumulated by technological progress. Thus, it is
implicitly assumed that (broader) capital accumulation, which is studied by neoclassical
theory, and technological knowledge are one and the same. In particular, Barro (1990)
assumes a Cobb-Douglas production function that features constant returns to scale for
the accumulation of private and infrastructure capital because part of this broader capital
accumulation is supposed to reﬂect technological progress needed to counteract diminishing
returns. It follows that infrastructure or private capital investments feature not only level
but also growth eﬀects in the long-run. In this model infrastructure investments are ﬁnanced
by means of distortionary taxes. These limit the long-run growth eﬀects. The analysis
results in an optimal level of infrastructure capital. Below, infrastructure investments are
growth enhancing while beyond they trigger negative growth eﬀects due to the distortionary
ﬁnancing. In the literature this ﬁnding is referred to as the Barro Curve. This approach has
been generalized in several ways, i.e. Turnovsky (1997) accounts for infrastructure capital
which is subject to congestion, Kosempel (2004) for the case of ﬁnitely lived households,
Turnovsky (2000) for an elastic labor supply and Ghosh and Mourmouras (2002) for an
open-economy framework. An alternative approach is followed by Bougheas et al. (2000)
who show that infrastructure investments increase an economy’s degree of specialization.
Finally, Ott and Turnovsky (2006) account for a partly excludability of infrastructure capital
which enables the provider to charge the users of infrastructure services. This more realistic
approach justiﬁes a private provision of infrastructure services.
The main empirical challenge in the literature on infrastructure and growth is the identiﬁ-
cation of cause and eﬀects. That is, a positive correlation between the two variables might
2be due to the eﬀect that governments spend more on infrastructure in countries or periods
that feature high growth since ﬁnancing constraints are less binding in this case. Several
empirical contributions report a positive relation between infrastructure and GDP-growth
for diﬀerent regions and time periods.1 Yet, most of these earlier studies do not address
the potential endogeneity of infrastructure investments. Roeller and Waverman (2001) for-
mulate a structural model for the supply and demand of telecommunication infrastructure
to separate cause and eﬀects on aggregate production.2 They ﬁnd large positive eﬀects of
telecommunication investments on economic growth in a panel of 21 OECD countries from
1970-90. Moreover, they show that higher GDP-growth triggers infrastructure investments
due to an increasing demand for infrastructure services. Belaid (2004) conﬁrms the results
with an analog methodology for a panel of 37 developing countries from 1985-2000. Fernald
(1999) shows that the rise in road services substantially increased the productivity (TFP)
across industry in the U.S. from 1953 to 1973.3 The author employs an implicit test for
endogeneity by showing that productivity growth is above average in vehicle intensive in-
dustries. Calder´ on and Serv´ en (2005) apply an instrumental variables approach to estimate
a positive causal eﬀect of diﬀerent infrastructure measures on GDP-growth in a panel of 121
countries from 1960-2000. Finally, Bougheas et al. (2000) and Hulten et al. (2003) detect a
positive impact of infrastructure on the degree of product specialization and productivity
in the U.S. and India, respectively.
The empirical results suggest a bivariate relation between the provision of infrastructure
capital and economic growth. Against this background, the World Bank emphasizes in a
recent report (World Bank (2008)) that infrastructure capital is an important determinant
of the innovative capacity of developing countries. The report refers to basic infrastructure,
i.e. roads, electricity, and telephony, as ”enabling technologies”that spur the spread of other
technologies by improving the capacity of ﬁrms to interact. World Bank (2008) concludes
(page 153): ”The government can also have an important impact on economic progress by
integrating new technology into its own operations, including in the provision of education,
health, and publicly-provided infrastructure.”
In this paper, we explicitly account for a reversed causality between infrastructure and
1Gramlich (1994) or Holtz-Eakin and Schwartz (1994) survey the earlier empirical literature on infras-
tructure and growth.
2The identiﬁcation of cause and eﬀects crucially hinges on the speciﬁcation of demand and supply
functions and the conformance of price elasticities across the OECD countries.
3He measures a rate of return of 100% before 1973 and a negative rate from 1973-89. To put it in the
words of Fernald (1999): ”the interstate highway system was very productive, but a second one would not
be”.
3growth in transition countries that are initially constraint by a low provision of infrastruc-
ture capital. We deviate from the existing literature in two ways. First, we endogenize
the provision of partly excludable infrastructure capital. In particular, we suppose that the
provider of infrastructure capital dynamically optimizes her expected future proﬁts from
current investments.4 In contrast, the existing literature, which is based on the Barro
(1990) approach, implicitly assumes that public infrastructure investments follow an auto-
matic rule governed by the static government’s balanced budget constraint. That is, the
amount of infrastructure investments is determined as a residual from a balanced budget
constraint deﬁned by the equilibrium level of GDP and the tax rate in an economy.5 Second,
we suppose that the distribution of specialized intermediate goods in a transition economy
is costly due to transportation or information costs. Furthermore, we assume that these
costs are decreasing in the economy’s infrastructure capital stock. It follows that the return
on investments in specialized intermediate goods, i.e. a country’s innovative capacity, is
aﬀected by the equilibrium provision of infrastructure capital in the economy. Hence, in
contrast to earlier studies, we explicitly allow for an impact of infrastructure capital on the
innovative capacity of a country.6 This is consistent with recent anecdotal and empirical
evidence, compare, e.g. Chandra (2006), World Bank (2008), Fernald (1999), Bougheas
et al. (2000), and Hulten et al. (2003).
We generalize previous ﬁndings by demonstrating that the allowance for a dynamically
optimizing provider of partly excludable infrastructure capital can lead to the existence
of multiple strictly positive balanced growth equilibria in economies that are initially con-
straint by scarce infrastructure capital. In a high-growth scenario, the high balanced growth
rate encourages investments in infrastructure by increasing the expected future proﬁts from
these investments. It follows that the economy is characterized by a high infrastructure
capital stock and fast technological change. In the low-growth scenario, the rate of tech-
nological change is constraint by the low provision of infrastructure capital which lowers
the incentive to invest in the adoption of new technologies and hence the rate of long-run
growth. The low equilibrium growth rate, in turn, limits investments in infrastructure by
4It does not matter if the infrastructure provider is private or public as long as she dynamically optimizes
the investments.
5Note that earlier approaches, which are based on a static government budget constraint, incorporate
a feedback eﬀect from the level of GDP to infrastructure investments. In contrast, the explicit modelling
of the incentives of a dynamically optimizing infrastructure provider involves a direct eﬀect of the growth
rate on expected future proﬁts from infrastructure investments.
6In particular, our approach diﬀers from the previous literature, which is based on Barro (1990), in that
we account for a general equilibrium eﬀect of the stock of infrastructure capital on the incentives to invest
in R&D instead of private capital accumulation.
4reducing the expected future proﬁts from infrastructure investments. In principle, a sizable
exogenous ﬁnancing source, e.g. a government subsidy, can induce a shift from the low to
the high equilibrium balanced growth path.
Section 2 outlines a standard endogenous growth model that accounts for the impact of
infrastructure capital a country’s innovative capacity. In section 3, we illustrate the condi-
tions that ensure the existence of multiple strictly positive balanced growth equilibria for a
given endogenous provision of infrastructure capital. The ﬁnal section concludes.
2 The partial model
In the this section, we present a growth model of endogenous technological change ` a la
Romer (1990). The basic model is extended in two ways. First, it accounts for transporta-
tion and information costs that distort the distribution of specialized intermediate goods
to ﬁnal output producers. Second, it includes an infrastructure capital sector that provides
infrastructure services to the economy. The endogenous provision of infrastructure capital
is analyzed in section 3.
The model consists of a competitive ﬁnal output sector, a intermediate goods sector which
is characterized by monopolistic competition, an infrastructure capital goods sector, and a
law of motion for the stock of technologies.
Final output sector (Y )
Competitive ﬁrms employ manufacturing labor (Ly), a (symmetric) combination of all vari-
eties of specialized intermediate goods (xj) and an aggregate of all varieties of infrastructure
services (G) to produce a ﬁnal output good (Y ). Each specialized intermediate good corre-
sponds to a new technology, whereas At denotes the stock of existing technologies. Hence









The Romer (1990) model involves several assumptions underlying the functional form of
the production function that are worth discussing. As in the basic model of growth results
from an increasing specialization of the intermediate goods sector, whereas each new inno-
vation (At) involves a new intermediate good. The speciﬁc form of the production function
supposes that the elasticity of substitution between diﬀerent intermediate goods or between
5intermediates and infrastructure capital is equal to one (Cobb-Douglas).7
For convenience, we normalize the price of the ﬁnal output good to one (py = 1). The
ﬁnal producers buy the intermediate products, pay a wage (wy) for manufacturing labor,
and a price (pG) for the usage of infrastructure services in the production process. Hence,
infrastructure capital is a productive input in the ﬁnal output sector which allows for the
analysis of a private provision of infrastructure capital (see section 3).8 The representative
ﬁrm in the competitive ﬁnal output sector takes prices as given and chooses its inputs to













pI,j,txj,tdj − wy,tLy,t − pG,tGt (1)
where (pI,j) is the price of of an intermediate product j.























Intermediate capital goods sector (x):
We assume that each intermediate good j is provided by a monopolist since the innovation
of a specialized intermediate good creates market power. An intermediate producer requires
η units of K to produce one unit of an intermediate j, i.e. K = η
R A
0 xjdj.10 In addition to
the basic Romer (1990) model, we impose the following assumptions.
Assumption 1: The provision of an intermediate good for ﬁnal producers is costly. It
involves transportation and information costs which increase the eﬀective costs of an inter-
7Alternatively, we could have employed a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function
as in Young (1993). This does not change the functioning of the model. In this more general case, the
equilibrium growth rate simply depends on an additional parameter measuring the degree of substitutability
in the economy.
8Note that we do not impose the special case of constant returns to scale in private and infrastructure
capital (β + α < 1) as in Barro (1990). As a consequence, including G in the production function of ﬁnal
producers exclusively has level but not growth eﬀects in the long-run.
9Note that ﬁnal output ﬁrms demand the same amount of each intermediate so that xj = x, pj = p,




j dj hold because of symmetry.
10We abstract from further constraints in the provision of private capital.
6mediate good by 1+φ. These costs are decreasing in the provision of infrastructure services
in the economy, i.e. φ = φ(G), φ0(G) < 0.
Thus, φ acts like a costly exogenous distortion of the interactions between intermediate and
ﬁnal producers. In this regard, its functioning is equivalent to the one of exogenous iceberg
costs in trade models. Assumption 1 is justiﬁed by the empirical evidence of Holtz-Eakin
and Schwartz (1994). He detects a negative relationship between intermediate business costs
and the provision of infrastructure capital in the economy. Moreover, Bougheas et al. (2000)
detect a positive relationship between infrastructure capital and the degree of specialization
in the intermediate sector for the U.S. economy.11
Assumption 2: φ is a negative, continuous, monotonic function of the infrastructure
capital stock with the following properties: φ(G), φ0 < 0, φ00 > 0, limG→∞ → 1, limG→0 →
∞. Thus, φ is convex, approaches a lower bound if G approaches inﬁnity and approaches
inﬁnity if G approaches 0.
Assumption 2 involves the constraint that the price premium can not become negative.
Moreover, it deﬁnes that intermediate specialization is not feasible as costs approach inﬁnity
in the absence of infrastructure capital.
Each monopolist chooses xj to maximize his proﬁts (πI,j) given the perceived inverse de-
mand function for each intermediate (pI,j,t), the interest rate (r) payments per unit of
capital, and the costs of providing the intermediate good to the ﬁnal producer (φ). Because
of symmetry the former is the same for all intermediates (pI,j = pI). Note that a successful
research project in the Romer (1990) results in the entry of a new intermediate producer.
Therefore, φ(G) is taken as given by potential new market entrants that base their entry
decision on the net present value of the return of potential research investments.12 In other
words, we separate the infrastructure service in the production of ﬁnal output from its
impact on potential business costs of new intermediate producers.13 Hence, we obtain the
11For example, φ captures ﬁxed entry costs which are necessary to set up a new business. In addition it
appears reasonable to assume that such entry costs are decreasing in the provision of infrastructure capital -
e.g. the appearance of high-speed telecommunication networks potentiates the ﬁrm’s ability to sell/transmit
specialized goods via internet without the need to establish a widespread distribution system (Fernald and
Ramnath, 2004). There are various additional plausible empirical anecdotes in favor of this assumption,
e.g. the construction of the interstate highway system in the U.S. (Fernald, 1999), the disposability of
electricity in the beginning of the last century (Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2004).
12At this stage, a new intermediate ﬁrm has not entered the market so that the aggregate infrastructure
capital stock is exogenous for the potential intermediate producer. Our qualitative results would not change
if φ could be (partly) internalized by intermediate producers as long as infrastructure capital is (partly)
non-rival. The reason is that intermediate producers do not internalize the externality of their own demand
for infrastructure capital on the costs of entry of other potential producers. The provision of infrastructure
in a decentralized equilibrium would be ineﬃcient.

















We suppose, in accordance with the literature on technology adoption (e.g. Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (1997) or Howitt (2000)), that the adoption of new technologies requires
investments in research activities. Hence, the rate of technological change ( ˙ A) is a positive
function of research labor (LR), a productivity parameter (λ) and its stock of knowledge
(A):
˙ At = λLR,tAt (7)
It is implicitly assumed that all researchers have free access to the entire stock of knowledge,
so that each new innovation/imitation induces a positive externality on future research.
This speciﬁcation is due to Romer (1990). An increase in population raises the rate of
technological change, hence it entails scale eﬀects. We abstract from such scale eﬀects by
setting population growth to zero (normalize L = 1).
Households
Identical, inﬁnitely lived households maximize their utility from consumption (C) subject
to a resource constraint and No-Ponzi game conditions. The utility function supposes a




1−σ , where σ is the degree of risk-aversion.






output ﬁrms from infrastructure services so that they can be charged for their direct use. On the other hand,
the provider can not control that the existence of an infrastructure network causes a positive externality
on the costs of the provision of new intermediate goods.
14In the following, we concentrate on symmetric balanced growth equilibria, so that we can omit time
subscripts to simplify the notation.
8where rt is the real interest rate, ρ a time-preference rate and σ the degree of risk-aversion.
Solution for a balanced growth equilibrium
So far we have not characterized the ﬁnancing structure of infrastructure capital (the market
structure in the sector). Yet, we will solve the (partial) model for a balanced growth
equilibrium, in which A, G, C and Y all grow at the same constant exponential rate, to
illustrate the mechanism of the model for a given ﬁnancing structure.
The key mechanism involving technological progress is a free-entry condition into the re-
search sector. It is the basic assumption underlying the market structure of monopolistic
competition and translates expected future proﬁts in the intermediate sectors into invest-
ments in innovation activities.15 In particular, the free entry condition into research ensures
that the present discounted value of expected future proﬁts from a new innovation equals
the costs for the production of a new design. If we assume that monopoly proﬁts last forever
the present discounted value equals π
r, where r is the real interest rate. The costs of a new
design are productivity adjusted wages paid to research labor (
wR








The labor force is free to work in the manufacturing or research sector so that in equilibrium
wages in both sectors must be equal (wy = wR).16 Given the wage in manufacturing (3)






It follows from (7) that the equilibrium growth rate of the technology stock amounts to
γ =
˙ A
A = λLR = λ(1−LY). We know from the production function that ﬁnal output grows
in a balanced growth equilibrium at the same rate as A. Hence,
˙ C
C also grows at the rate γ.
If we substitute for LY from (10) and r = γσ + ρ from (8) we obtain the following growth
15Hellwig and Irmen (2001) show that expected future rents due to imperfect competition are not in
general necessary to ensure investments in R&D since intentional actions of entrepreneurs looking for
proﬁts can trigger such investments even in perfectly competitive markets.
16We abstract from any labor market constraints (L = LR + LY ).





α(1 − α)λ − χρ(1 + φ(G))
α(1 − α) + χσ(1 + φ(G))
(11)
We can infer from (11) that the growth rate of the stock of technologies is an increasing




∂2G > 0). Since (endogenous) tech-
nological change is the only source of GDP-growth in a balanced growth equilibrium, GDP
also grows at that rate.17
Proposition I: Given the assumptions underlying the models of endogenous technical
change ` a la Romer (1990) and Assumptions 1-2, it follows that the rate of technical change




Intuitively, a higher provision of infrastructure reduces the business costs in the intermediate
sector (φ(G)). This cost-reducing feature of infrastructure capital augments the demand
for specialized intermediate goods and hence increases the net present value of the returns
of investments in new technologies. Due to the research arbitrage (free-entry) condition
this leads to a shift of resources from the manufacturing sector (Ly) to innovation activities
(LR). Consequently, a low provision of infrastructure capital represents an impediment for
economic growth because investments in new technologies are relatively unproﬁtable.
Besides, γ is a positive function of the exogenous productivity parameter in the research
sector (λ). This relationship is quite crucial since the eﬀectiveness of domestic innovation
activities measured by λ determines the potential scale of the positive infrastructure ex-
ternality on the incentive to invest in research (
∂2γ
∂G∂λ > 0). If λ is high, the impact of
the infrastructure externality is large. Hence, there exists a complementarity between the
eﬀect of infrastructure investments and the eﬀectiveness of the research sector. Since λ is
exogenous it represents all country-speciﬁc factors that are neglected in this model and that
inﬂuence the eﬀectiveness of the research sector, e.g. intellectual property rights, tertiary
education, or corruption. It is important to note that the equilibrium growth rate is not
necessarily strictly positive. If we set (11) equal to 0 we can compute the threshold level for
17The equilibrium growth rate suggests a minor technical restriction: In order to ensure that consumer’s
preferences are ﬁnite we need to impose that the growth of current utility (1−σ)γ is less than the discount
rate ρ.
10the productivity of the research sector (λ∗) such that γ is positive: λ∗ >
χρ
α(1−α)(1 + φ(G)).
3 Endogenous provision of infrastructure capital
In this section, we endogenize the infrastructure capital stock (G). Ex ante, the interaction
between an endogenous infrastructure supply and economic growth is not clear. On the one
hand, infrastructure investments are costly or dissipate scarce resources. On the other hand,
higher growth facilitates the ﬁnancing of infrastructure investments due to higher expected
future proﬁts from infrastructure investments. In this regard, our results are based on two
additional assumptions.
Assumption 3: Investments in infrastructure require diﬀerent scarce resources than in-
vestments in research.
Assumption 3 reﬂects that infrastructure investments are intensive in unskilled labor while
research is human capital intensive.
Assumption 4: Infrastructure capital is partly excludable and provided by a dynamically
optimizing supplier facing potentially increasing marginal investment costs C(It,t). C(It,t)
is an increasing continuous, monotonic function with C1 = ∂C
∂It > 0, C2 = ∂C
∂t ≥ 0 and
CIt,t = ∂2C
∂It∂t ≥ 0.
Assumption 4 requires that the infrastructure provider optimizes her expected future proﬁts
from infrastructure investments. Note that it does not matter if the provider is private or
public as long as she dynamically optimizes her proﬁts. Moreover, the costs of supplying
infrastructure are potentially increasing over time since the costs of infrastructure resources,
e.g. unskilled labor, are increasing with the income level in the economy. Both assumptions
appear to be empirically plausible.
In the following, we show that this framework leads to a reversed causality between the
provision of infrastructure and GDP-growth implying the existence of multiple balanced
growth-equilibria in the presence of increasing marginal infrastructure investment costs
over time.
Infrastructure capital goods sector (G)
Conceptually, we suppose that the infrastructure sector consists of competitive ﬁrms supply-
ing infrastructure services and a monopolistic network provider.18 The competitive service
18Due to ﬁx costs (see below) the sector displays a natural monopoly. It does not matter if the network
11ﬁrms take the perceived inverse demand function for infrastructure services (pG,t) as given
and pay a proportional rental price (rG,t) for the access to operate the infrastructure net-
work. Thus, as long as the infrastructure service sector is perfectly competitive, we have
pG,t = rG,t. In this case, it makes no diﬀerence if the network provider supplies infrastruc-
ture services himself or sells the rights to do so to competitive ﬁrms. The network provider
invests It in infrastructure capital (Gt) incurring variable (C(It,t)) and ﬁxed (F) investment
costs. Note that time enters as an explicit argument in the costs function since we do not
exclude that the cost function depends on additional time-dependent (endogenous) vari-
ables (e.g. At or Yt). Thus, marginal costs increase over time if C2 = ∂C
∂t > 0 (e.g. strictly
convex investment costs). Increasing marginal costs might be a more realistic assumption
for an economy that grows according to a balanced growth rate.19
Monopolistic provider of infrastructure capital
The instantaneous proﬁt function of the monopolist is given by the perceived inverse demand
function (pG,t), the investment, and the ﬁx costs: πG,t = pG,tGt − C(It,t) − F. It follows
that the monopolist faces a dynamic optimization problem. The depreciation rate of the
infrastructure capital stock amounts to δ, so that ˙ Gt = It − δGt. Hence, the private
monopolist chooses It to maximize the (discounted) current value of its expected future
proﬁts subject to ˙ Gt = It − δGt and
R ∞
t πG,sds ≥ ˆ F.20 If the latter condition is satisﬁed






−ρt[pG,tGt − C(It,t) − F]dt, ˙ Gt = It − δGt (12)
To solve the dynamic optimization problem we deﬁne the current value Hamiltonian:
H(It,Gt,λt,t) = e
−ρt[pG,tGt − C(It,t) − F]dt + λt[It − δGt] (13)
provider is private or public as long as she dynamically optimizes its investments.
19For example, we might assume that the marginal costs increase in the stock of knowledge or GDP to
take into account that investment costs are higher if more advanced technologies are applied or if the size
of the economy increases.
20If the ﬁx costs arise every period we have [ ˆ F =
R ∞
t (F)ds]. If they arise only in the ﬁrst period we have
[ ˆ F = F].
21Note that we assume for simplicity that the infrastructure monopolist discounts future proﬁts with ρ and
not r. In the latter case G = G(γ) would be a higher-order non-linear function of γ. Given C(It,t) = µYtIt
this results in three balanced growth rates whereas only two are strictly positive. Finally, recall that we
abstract from additional private capital constraints in our economy.
12Combining the ﬁrst-order conditions we get the following optimality conditions:
[p
0
G,tGt + pG,t] = CIt
 





˙ Gt = It − δGt (15)
lim
t→∞[λtIt] = 0 (16)
In the case of constant marginal investment costs ( ˙ CIt =
∂CIt
∂t = 0), the ﬁrst condition states
that instantaneous marginal revenue must equal marginal costs. Otherwise, the right hand
side is adjusted to incorporate the dynamic eﬀects of infrastructure investments on future
proﬁts stemming from an increase in the shadow price of infrastructure capital over time.
The monopolist extends the provision of G in this case. Intuitively, she anticipates that the
shadow price of infrastructure capital increases in the presence of positive balanced growth
due to two reasons: (i) future investments are more costly relative to current investments,
(ii) the demand for infrastructure capital increases. Hence, she is better oﬀ producing more
infrastructure capital today since its future value increases for him. The second condition
gives the law of motion for infrastructure capital and the third is a transversality condition.
If we substitute in (14) for pG,t from (4), and solve for Gt, we obtain:
Gt =
β2Yt
CIt(ρ + δ − M(γ))
(17)
The infrastructure capital stock is increasing in the level of GDP. In addition, it is an
increasing function of the elasticity of ﬁnal output with respect to infrastructure capital as
a rise in β implies a higher demand for G. In contrast, it is decreasing in the depreciation
rate (δ) and the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution (ρ). However, we know from (11)
that G must be constant in a balanced growth path. It then follows from (17) that marginal
investment costs (CIt) must grow proportional to GDP in order to sustain balanced growth.
Hence, the monopolist faces increasing marginal investment costs. In this case, the growth
rate of marginal investment costs is a positive function of the balanced growth rate of the
economy:
˙ CIt
CIt = M(γ), M0 > 0, M00 = 0. Thus, the infrastructure capital stock is an
increasing function of the equilibrium growth rate of the economy (∂G
∂γ > 0).22
Moreover, we show in Appendix A that ∂2G
∂2γ > 0 holds for reasonable parameter values.
22The exact derivative is given in Appendix A. Besides, we show that a technical suﬃcient condition for
∂
2G
∂2γ > 0 is δ + ρ > γ.
13Figure 1: Multiple equilibrium growth rates
Thus, the infrastructure capital stock is an increasing, convex function of the balanced
growth rate (G = G(γ), where G0 > 0, G00 > 0). We also know from section 2 that the
balanced growth rate is in turn an increasing, convex function of the stock of infrastructure
capital (γ = γ(G), where γ0 > 0, γ00 > 0). In addition, both functions are monotonic
and continuous. Consequently, we potentially obtain two diﬀerent equilibrium growth rates
(ﬁxed points) if we combine (11) and (17) to solve for a general equilibrium balanced growth
path. Moreover, we assume that γ(G0) < γ(Gmax), where Gmax is deﬁned as the level of
G such that γ(G) → ∞. Since γ is bounded by zero, γ(0) = 0 (due to the property
that limG→0 φ(G) → ∞) and G(0) = G0 > 0 holds in equilibrium, it follows from the
intermediate value theorem and the properties of the two functions γ(G) and G(γ) that
two strictly positive balanced growth equilibria exist. The result is illustrated in Figure 1.
Thus, the reversed causality between the provision of infrastructure capital and economic
growth potentially results in two equilibrium balanced growth rates. In the high-growth
scenario, the economy is characterized by a high infrastructure capital stock and fast tech-
nological change. In the low-growth scenario, the rate of technological change is constraint
by the low provision of infrastructure capital which lowers the incentive to invest in research
and hence the rate of GDP-growth. This in turn limits the demand for infrastructure invest-
ments (ﬁnancing constraint). Hence, if the initial stock of infrastructure capital (relative to
14GDP) is too low, the growth rate of the economy is constrained. This, in turn, constraints
the supply of infrastructure services so that the economy is trapped in a low-growth equi-
librium. It follows from (11) that the crucial initial infrastructure level, that needs to be
exceeded in order to result in the high-growth equilibrium, is declining in the quality of
(research-) institutions (λ). Thus, the growth eﬀect of infrastructure investments in tran-
sition countries depends crucially on complementary structural factors that improve the
innovative capacity to adopt new technologies, e.g. an adequate quality of schooling.
In principle, suﬃcient public subsidies for infrastructure investments, which represent an
external ﬁnancing source in the model, can install the high-growth scenario. Note that
public subsidies do not in general induce economic growth, but might trigger the transition
to the higher balanced growth path (depending on the ﬁnancing source).23 The results
of the general equilibrium model with an endogenous supply of infrastructure capital are
summarized in Proposition II.
Proposition II: Given the assumptions underlying the models of endogenous technical
change ` a la Romer (1990), Assumptions 1-4, and 0 < G0 < Gmax, there exist two strictly
positive balanced growth rates with γ1 > γ2 > 0 if the costs of infrastructure investments
are increasing over time (with the size of the economy). The high-growth economy is char-
acterized by fast technological change and a high stock of infrastructure capital, while the
low-growth economy by a low provision of infrastructure capital due to reduces expected fu-
ture proﬁts from infrastructure investments.
The proof is given in Appendix A.
In the following, we present an explicit example. In particular, we suppose that investment




In the following, we assume that the marginal costs of infrastructure investments are in-
creasing in the level of GDP: C(It) = µYtIt.24 This relationship is intuitively appealing since
the production costs of infrastructure services are expected to depend on the wage level of
23We do not analyze the transition path belonging to both balanced growth path, but the growth rate
during the transition from γ2 to γ1 may in principle exceed γ1. If so, it suggests that the extraordinary
growth performance of some recent economies (growth miracles) can be explained by one-time growth eﬀects
(and its transition path) due to the accumulation of infrastructure capital.
24We et c = 0 because this cost function already captures congestion eﬀects.
15an economy just like the production costs of ﬁnal output or research. This cost function
can be derived endogenously by assuming that the monopolist needs to hire unskilled labor
(U) in order to produce infrastructure capital. If the wage of unskilled labor is proportional
to the wage of skilled labor (L) the costs of infrastructure investments are increasing in
the level of GDP. The costs function satisﬁes the suﬃcient conditions for multiple balanced




α(1 − α)µ(λ + δ + ρ) + β2χσ + χµ(σ(δ + ρ) − ρ) + Z1/2





α(1 − α)µ(λ + δ + ρ) + β2χσ + χµ(σ(δ + ρ) − ρ) − Z1/2
2µ(α(1 − α) + χσ)
(19)
where Z = [α(1−α)µ(λ+δ+ρ)+β2χσ+χµ(σ(δ+ρ)−ρ)]2−4µ[α(1−α)+χσ][α(1−α)λµ(δ+
ρ)−ρ(β2+χµ(δ+ρ))] > 0. As long as λ > λ∗∗ =
ρβ2+ρχµ(ρ+δ)
α(1−α)µ(δ+ρ) both growth rates are strictly
positive. This conditions relates the exogenous productivity of the research sector to the
weighted cost of infrastructure investment/capital and ensures that expected future proﬁts
from investments in innovations are positive. Moreover, the ﬁrst regime strictly dominates
the second in terms of economic growth (γ1 > γ2).
Both equilibrium growth rates are strictly increasing in λ (given λ > λ∗∗).26 In addition, an
increase in the exogenous (institutional) productivity parameter has a larger impact on the




∂λ > 0). This result follows directly from the
fact that the return of investments in new technologies is constrained by high intermediate
business costs (low infrastructure capital) in the low-growth equilibrium. Besides, γ1 is
increasing in the share of infrastructure capital in the ﬁnal output sector (β). Hence, γ1
can potentially still be raised to a higher balanced growth path by an additional external
ﬁnancing source.27 In contrast, the impact of β on γ2 is indeterminate and depends on the
realizations of the parameter values.28 Finally, an increase in the constant factor of the
marginal investment costs (µ) causes a decline in γ1. Again, the impact on γ2 is indeter-
minate. Thus, under certain parameter realization the positive eﬀect of µ on the level of
the shadow price of infrastructure capital may outweigh its direct negative eﬀects on the
25Note that the infrastructure provider does not internalize the static eﬀect of an increase in Gt on the
output level in a decentralized equilibrium.
26The exact derivatives are reported in Appendix A.
27Thus, the infrastructure externality outweighs the ineﬃciencies from the monopolies for the infrastruc-
ture capital stock belonging to γ1. We discuss this result separately in the next section.
28Interestingly, the negative eﬀect of β on the level of the shadow price of infrastructure capital may
outweigh the positive direct eﬀect on the instantaneous proﬁt function of the infrastructure monopolist
under certain parameter realizations.
16instantaneous proﬁt function of the infrastructure monopolist.
4 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the interdependence between infrastructure and growth in a transition
economy that is initially constrained by a scarce infrastructure capital stock. Our theoret-
ical approach deviates from the previous literature is two ways. First, we explicitly model
the eﬀect of infrastructure capital in an economy where growth stems from investments
in innovative intermediate goods. In particular, we assume that infrastructure reduces
the distribution costs of specialized intermediate products. Second, we account for an in-
frastructure provider that dynamically optimizes her expected future proﬁts from current
investments instead of implicitly assuming that infrastructure investments follow an au-
tomatic rule governed by the static government’s budget constraint. We show that these
assumptions lead to a bivariate causality between infrastructure and growth. Moreover, we
demonstrate that this framework leads to multiple strictly positive balanced growth equilib-
ria if (i) infrastructure investments require diﬀerent resources than research, e.g. unskilled
labor, and (ii) if the costs of providing infrastructure, e.g. wages for unskilled labor, are
increasing with the income level of the economy. That is, an economy that is character-
ized by low initial infrastructure investments may suﬀer from positive but reduced long-run
economic growth as compared to an economy that experiences suﬃcient initial infrastruc-
ture investments to converge to a higher long-run equilibrium balanced growth path. In
the former scenario, economies are trapped in a low growth equilibria since a low balanced
growth rate reduces the expected future proﬁts from current infrastructure investments.
External ﬁnancing sources, e.g. public subsidies, can potentially trigger the convergence
to a high balanced growth equilibrium. Moreover, a structural change in complementary
factors that inﬂuence the eﬃciency of technology adoptions, e.g. better schooling or the
removal of external trade barriers, may trigger the convergence to a higher long-run bal-
anced growth path. In particular, these complementary factors raise the expected proﬁts
from infrastructure investments.
The model illustrates that the relationship between infrastructure and growth is poten-
tially non-linear. Thus, infrastructure investment might induce tremendous growth eﬀects
in transition countries if they trigger the convergence of the economy to a higher bal-
17anced growth path. This scenario is more likely if complementary structural factors are
growth-promoting, e.g. an adequate quality of schooling. On the other hand, the impact
of infrastructure investments (subsidies) on growth might be very low or even insigniﬁcant
if they are not suﬃciently large in the low growth scenario. Thus, future empirical work
should account for potential non-linearities in the infrastructure growth nexus due to the
existence of a bivariate causality. The importance of a non-linear empirical relationship can
be examined with cross-country as well as ﬁrm-level data if regional infrastructure measures
are available.
18A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition II
Given the assumptions underlying Proposition I, we know that the balanced growth rate is a
continuous, monotonic, increasing function of the stock of infrastructure capital (assuming
λ > λ∗∗ =
ρβ2+ρχµ(ρ+δ)






























where ˆ λ = aλ − χσφ(G) > 0 and a = α(1 − α) > 0.
Hence, the balanced growth rate is a strictly convex function of the stock of infrastructure
capital: γ = γ(G), γ0(G) > 0, γ00(G) > 0.
The equilibrium provision of infrastructure capital is given in (17). The marginal variable
investment costs are a continuous, monotonic, increasing function of time (
∂CIt
∂t >0). In order
to sustain (positive) balanced growth, we assume that marginal infrastructure investment
costs increase proportional to the GDP-level in the economy (It = δGt), but can not exceed
it.29 It follows from (14) that infrastructure capital is a continuous, monotonic function
of the balanced growth rate in equilibrium. This allows us to deﬁne N(t) = Yt
CIt, where
N0(t) ≥ 0, N00(t) ≥ 0. We also deﬁned
˙ CIt
CItt = M(t), where M0(t) > 0 and M00(t) = 0 in a




β2N0[δ + ρ − M(γ)] + β2N(γ)M0




[β2N00[δ + ρ − M(γ)] − β2N0M0][δ + ρ − M(γ)] + [β2N0[δ + ρ − M(γ)]M0]
[δ + ρ − M(γ)]3
+
[β2N0F 0 + β2N(γ)M00][δ + ρ − M(γ)] + β2N(γ)M0M0
[δ + ρ − M(γ)]3 > 0
29Note that this is a necessary but not a suﬃcient condition for the existence of a balanced growth
equilibrium. In order to obtain a suﬃcient condition, we would need to impose quantitative assumptions
on φ(Gt) and C(It,t) relative to Yt.
19The ﬁrst derivative is always positive. A suﬃcient condition for the second derivative to be
positive is δ+ρ−M(γ) > 0, which we assume. Hence, we do not allow that the growth rate
of the marginal (variable) infrastructure investment costs exceeds the summation of the de-
preciation rate for infrastructure capital and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. A
violation of this condition is empirically irrelevant so that the restriction is rather technical.
Hence, the infrastructure capital stock is a strictly convex function of the balanced growth
rate: G = G(γ), G0(γ) > 0, G00(γ) > 0.
In addition, we know that γ = γ(0) = 0 since limG→0 φ(G) → ∞ and G = G(0) = G0 > 0
holds by assumption. Consequently, given a balanced growth path exists, it features two
strictly positive balanced growth rates γ1 and γ2 with γ1 > γ2.
A.2 Marginal investment costs increase in Yt:
In the following, we report the partial derivatives of γ1 and γ2 (from (18) and (19)) with








































β2χ(αµ(2ρ + σ(δ + λ + ρ)) + σ(β2σχ + χµ(ρ + σ(δ + ρ)) − σZ1/2))




β2χ(αµ(2ρ + σ(δ + λ + ρ)) + σχ(β2σ + µ(ρ + σ(δ + ρ))) + Z1/2)
2µ2(a + σρ)Z1/2 <> 0
where Z = [aµ(λ + δ + ρ) + β2χσ + χµ(σ(δ + ρ) − ρ)]2 − 4µ[a + χσ][aλµ(δ + ρ) − ρ(β2 +
χµ(δ + ρ))] > 0 and a = α(1 − α).
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